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Insurance
by Maren R. Cave *
Thomas D. Martin **
and Bradley S. Wolff ***
I. INTRODUCTION
During this Survey period, the courts in Georgia returned to the usual
abundance of automobile and uninsured motorist (UM) cases, the
summaries of which make up most of this annual update. 1 The courts
decided three cases involving UM coverage limits that were less than the
policies’ liability limits and the claims of insureds that the carriers owed
coverage equal to the liability limits. The insurers prevailed in all three
cases. In a fourth case, the Georgia Court of Appeals determined that an
insured could not sue a tortfeasor in the name of “John Doe,” where the
person’s name was known but his whereabouts were unknown. 2 The
court of appeals also decided that an insurance policy delivered in
Georgia could be interpreted according to Kentucky law and considered,
but did not decide whether a requirement that the insured notify the

* Partner in the firm of Swift Currie McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. St. Olaf College
(B.A., 1997); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2000). Member,
State Bar of Georgia, Atlanta Bar Association; The CLM Alliance; Defense Research
Institute; Georgia Defense Lawyers Association; Lawyers Club of Atlanta; Order of
Barristers.
** Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.A., summa cum laude, 1984); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1987). Member, State Bar of Georgia (Tort and Insurance Practice and Litigation);
Defense Research Institute.
*** Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt
University (B.A., cum laude, 1983); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1986). Member, State Bar of Georgia; Defense Research Institute; Georgia Defense Lawyers
Association.
1 For an analysis of insurance law during the prior survey period, see Bradley S. Wolff,
Maren R. Cave, and Thomas D. Martin, Insurance, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 71
MERCER L. REV. 117 (2019).
2 Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 355 Ga. App. 82, 842 S.E.2d 530 (2020).
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insurer of a proposed settlement was a substantive or remedial matter. 3
The case was therefore returned to the trial court on that issue. 4 In the
liability insurance arena, there were a couple of important decisions
concerning declaratory judgment actions, another involving the
cooperation of an insured in a liability claim, and another concerning
liability coverage under a homeowner’s policy for injury claims relating
to an incident involving a motor vehicle. In the property arena, the survey
found both state and federal decisions on first-party issues like
rescission, the duty to read, coverage under a “seepage and leakage”
exclusion, and the legal effect of accepting premiums after a lapse in
coverage.
II. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CASES
A. Duty to Offer Statutory Minimum UM Coverage Not Triggered by
Increase in Liability Coverage
In Hunter v. Progressive Mountain Insurance Co., 5 the Georgia Court
of Appeals held that an insured’s request for an increase in liability
coverage under an existing automobile insurance policy does not per se
trigger an insurer’s duty under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1) 6 to offer the
insured the mandated statutory minimum UM coverage. 7 After
continuously renewing their Progressive Mountain Insurance Company
(Progressive Mountain) automobile insurance policy for two years, the
Hunters elected to increase their liability coverage from $50,000/person
and $100,000/accident to $100,000/person and $300,000/accident. The
couple did not request—and Progressive Mountain did not offer—a
corresponding increase in their $25,000/person and $50,000/accident UM
limits. 8 In addressing whether Progressive Mountain had a duty to offer
the Hunters increased UM coverage, the court made clear that an insurer
must offer the statutory minimum UM coverage only when (i) an insured
first obtains UM coverage; or (ii) an insured requests an increase in UM
coverage. 9 Because the Hunters’ increase in liability coverage did not (i)

Helton v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 354 Ga. App. 208, 840 S.E.2d 692 (2020).
Id. at 213–14, 840 S.E.2d at 697.
5 353 Ga. App. 444, 838 S.E.2d 112 (2020).
6 O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1) (2020).
7 Hunter, 353 Ga. App. at 444, 828 S.E.2d at 112–13; see O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1) (2020)
(outlining UM coverage requirements for Georgia automobile insurance policies).
8 Id.
9 Id. at 446, 838 S.E.2d at 114, (citing Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Morgan,
341 Ga. App. 396, 800 S.E.2d 612 (2017)), discussed in Bradley S. Wolff, Maren R. Cave &
Stephen M. Schatz, Insurance, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 69 MERCER L. REV. 117, 119
(2017).
3
4
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create a new policy such that the policy was again “issued or delivered”
within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1); or (ii) constitute a
requested increase in UM coverage, 10 the court found that Progressive
Mountain had no duty to offer the Hunters an increase in UM coverage. 11
However, the court pointed out that its decision was based on the fact the
Hunters had elected to “decouple” their liability and UM limits. 12 Where
the limits were “still linked in some way,” the result might well be
different. 13
B. Affirmative Choice of Unequal Limits Not Affected by 2008 “Added
On” Amendment to O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1) makes an automobile insurance policy’s UM
limits equal to the liability limits by default, though an insured may
“affirmatively choose” lower UM limits. 14 In Cline v. Allstate Property &
Casualty Insurance, 15 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that an
affirmative choice for lower UM limits made prior to enactment of the
“added on” amendment to O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 in 2008 16 was not nullified
by the amendment. 17 In 2003, the Clines entered into an Allstate
automobile insurance policy with equal UM and liability coverage limits.
In October 2008, before the “added on” amendment went into effect, Mrs.
Cline increased the liability limit to $100,000 and completed a new
coverage selection/rejection form, electing to keep the UM coverage of
$25,000/person. The Clines continuously renewed the policy through
2016, when Mr. Cline was injured in an automobile accident. Mr. Cline
argued that the “added on” amendment nullified the October 2008
affirmative election for lower UM coverage, requiring Allstate to provide
him default UM coverage in an amount equal to the policy’s $100,000

Id. at 447–48, 838 S.E.2d at 114.
Id. at 447–48, 838 S.E.2d at 115.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1)(B)(2020).
15 354 Ga. App. 415, 841 S.E.2d 63 (2020).
16 Ga. S. Bill 276, Reg. Sess., 2008 Ga. Laws 801 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.
§ 33-7-11). Prior to the 2008 amendment, all Georgia UM policies were “reduced by”
policies, “under which the UM limits of liability [were] reduced by any amount that the
insured received from the tortfeasor’s insurer.” Cline, 354 Ga. App. at 416–17, 841 S.E.2d
at 65 (quoting Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rothman, 332 Ga. App. 670, 672, 774 S.E.2d
735, 738 (2015)). “The 2008 amendment introduced [the option of] “added on” [UM]
coverage, “which provides that the applicable limits of liability are available to cover any
damages an insured suffers which exceed the tortfeasor’s policy limits,” and made “added
on” coverage the default, absent an insured’s written request for “reduced by” coverage. Id.
at 417, 841 S.E.2d at 65 (quoting Rothman, 332 Ga. App. at 672, 774 S.E.2d at 737).
17 354 Ga. App. at 416, 841 S.E.2d at 65.
10
11
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liability limit. 18 The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the “added on”
amendment did not affect Mrs. Cline’s right to affirmatively choose
unequal UM and liability limits; but it did result in the UM coverage
being converted from “reduced by” to “added on.” 19
C. Selection of Unequal Limits by Pre-Filled Application with
Disclaimer Constitutes Affirmative Choice
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also
addressed what it means for an insured to “affirmatively choose” lower
UM limits under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1). 20 In State Auto Property &
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Jacobs, 21 Jacobs signed a pre-filled automobile
insurance application specifically requesting $25,000 in UM coverage.
The application also contained a disclaimer acknowledging that UM
coverage had been offered and explained to him and that he selected the
limits shown in the application. 22 The court held that Jacobs
affirmatively chose the $25,000 UM limit, and that it was
inconsequential that Jacobs’s signature and election came in a pre-filled
application rather than a separate, written statement because Jacobs
had a duty to read and understand the policy. 23
D. Insured Cannot Sue Known Tortfeasor as “John Doe”
Under Georgia’s UM statute, a plaintiff may only institute an action
against a “John Doe” defendant when the owner or operator of a vehicle
is unknown. 24 When the owner or operator is known, he or she must be
named as a defendant; service by publication is authorized if the person
resides out of the state, has departed from the state, cannot after due
diligence be found within the state, or avoids service. 25 In Bell v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 26 the Georgia Court of Appeals
made clear that its decision in Smith v. Phillips 27 did not allow a plaintiff
to sue a defendant as John Doe when she knew her tortfeasor’s identity,
although she did not know where the tortfeasor may be found. 28
Id. at 416, 841 S.E.2d at 64.
Id. at 417, 841 S.E.2d at 65.
20 State Auto Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Jacobs, 791 F. App’x. 28 (11th Cir.
2019).
21 Id. at 30.
22 Id. at 31.
23 Id. at 31–32.
24 O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(d) (2020).
25 O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(e).
26 355 Ga. App. 82, 842 S.E.2d 530.
27 172 Ga. App. 459, 323 S.E.2d 669 (1984).
28 Bell, 355 Ga. App. at 83, 842 S.E.2d at 531.
18
19
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Bell was in an automobile accident with Brown in California. Bell
knew Brown and communicated with him following the accident. When
Bell filed suit in Georgia, however, she named John Doe, not Brown, as
the defendant. Bell served her UM insurer, State Farm, with a copy of
the complaint, but did not attempt to locate or serve Brown. The trial
court granted summary judgment to State Farm on the ground that Bell
did not serve Brown before the expiration of the statute of limitations,
preventing her from obtaining a judgment against Brown and therefore
precluded her from obtaining UM benefits from State Farm. 29
On appeal, Bell quoted a line from the decision in Smith: “a motorist
or vehicle owner against whom a claim is pending, but who cannot be
located, is treated as an uninsured motorist, since ‘whereabouts
unknown’ is now equal to ‘identity unknown’ and ‘identity unknown’ is
equal to ‘uninsured motorist’ under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(d).” 30 Bell argued
that because there was no accident report, she did not have Brown’s date
of birth, address, or other identifying information that could be used to
determine where he lived. Therefore, she argued Brown’s whereabouts
were unknown, which “equals” his identity being unknown, permitting
her to sue “John Doe” in lieu of service on Brown before proceeding
against State Farm. 31
The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected Bell’s argument, noting that the
line from Smith was taken out of context. 32 The court explained that, in
Smith, the plaintiff filed a complaint against a non-resident tortfeasor
for injuries arising from an automobile accident. 33 The plaintiff’s UM
carrier participated in the suit under the tortfeasor’s name rather than
its own. 34 The trial court entered judgment against the UM carrier, 35 and
the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that (i) the plaintiff
needed to obtain at least a nominal judgment against the tortfeasor for
judgment to be entered against the UM carrier, and (ii) the UM carrier
was not a named party, so no judgment could be entered against it. 36 The
Smith court used the language quoted by Bell to explain that the trial
court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the non-resident
tortfeasor; but should have allowed an action to proceed against him so
Id. at 82, 842 S.E.2d at 530–31.
Brief for Appellant at *9–10, Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 842 S.E.2d 530
(2020) (No. A20A0342), 2019 GA APP. CT. BRIEFS LEXIS 2800 (quoting Smith v. Phillips,
172 Ga. App. at 462–63, 323 S.E.2d at 673).
31 Brief for Petitioner at *9, Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 842 S.E.2d 530 (2020)
(No. A20A0342).
32 Bell, 355 Ga. App. at 83, 842 S.E.2d at 531.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
29
30
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that the plaintiff could satisfy the condition precedent to seeking
judgment against his UM carrier. 37 Bell, on the other hand, never sued
Brown in his own name and never attempted to serve him. Thus, there
was never a claim pending against Brown and Smith did not apply. 38
E. A Policy Delivered In Georgia Could Be Considered A Kentucky
Policy, Yet Georgia Law May Apply To A Particular Provision If It
Is Remedial
As discussed in the 2018 Survey, 39 in Newstrom v. Auto-Owners
Insurance Co., 40 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that when an insured
under a Georgia policy is injured out of state but seeks to recover UM
benefits in Georgia, Georgia law controls as to “procedural and remedial
matters,” like the effect of a release. 41 In Helton v. United Services
Automobile Association, 42 the court left open whether an out-of-state’s
notice provision regarding settlement is a substantive or remedial matter
when an insured is injured in Georgia and seeks to recover UM benefits
in Georgia. 43
The Heltons entered into an automobile insurance policy in Kentucky
with United Services Automobile Association (USAA) but had the policy
delivered to their new home in Georgia. Mrs. Helton was subsequently
involved in an automobile accident in Georgia. Without notifying USAA,
she settled with the other driver’s liability carrier and executed a
“Limited Liability Release Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1.” She then
turned to USAA to recover her alleged remaining uncompensated
damages. 44
USAA moved for summary judgment, pointing to a policy provision
excluding coverage where the insured failed to provide prior written
notice to USAA of a proposed settlement as required by Kentucky law.
Mrs. Helton argued that because the policy was delivered in Georgia,
Georgia law governed the policy, including the effect of the release. Citing
Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bourgalt, 45 the trial court found that
delivery in Georgia did not control, and because the policy said it covered
vehicle garaged in Kentucky, was written on Kentucky forms, and used
Id.
Id.
39 See Thomas D. Martin, Bradley S. Wolff, & Maren R. Cave, Insurance, Annual Survey
of Georgia Law, 70 MERCER L. REV. 111, 112–13 (2018).
40 343 Ga. App. 576, 807 S.E.2d 501 (2017).
41 Id. at 578, 807 S.E.2d at 503.
42 354 Ga. App. at 208, 840 S.E.2d at 693.
43 Id. at 210–11, 840 S.E.2d at 695
44 Id. at 209, 840 S.E.2d at 694.
45 263 Ga. 157, 429 S.E.2d 908 (1993).
37
38

2020]

INSURANCE

137

Kentucky rates, it would be considered a Kentucky policy. The court
therefore granted summary judgment for USAA. 46
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court’s
conclusion on the delivery argument. 47 It noted, however, that Mrs.
Helton had asserted an additional argument: that even if Kentucky
substantive law applied to the policy generally, Georgia law governed the
particular coverage issue at hand—whether Mrs. Helton took the steps
necessary to assert a UM claim under the policy—as a “procedural and
remedial matter.” 48 The court stated that this argument could not be
resolved by Amica, because Amica concerned the enforceability of an
exclusion that turned on a circumstance of the collision itself; while Mrs.
Helton’s argument concerned whether UM coverage was properly denied
for failure to comply with a policy notice provision after her accident. 49
Because the trial court only broadly concluded that Kentucky substantive
law governed the policy without addressing this particular argument, the
court vacated the judgment and remanded the case. 50
III. LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES
A. Timing and Purpose of Declaratory Judgment Actions
The Georgia Court of Appeals issued two decisions clarifying the
purpose and timing for declaratory judgment actions in Georgia. In
United Specialty Insurance Co. v. Cardona-Rodriguez, 51 the Georgia
Court of Appeals reminded us that declaratory judgments should be
utilized for instances of actual uncertainty regarding a policy’s
coverage. 52 After an employee of a car wash company injured a patron,
the insurer of the car wash company, United Specialty Insurance
Company (United Specialty), rejected a $100,000 time-limited demand
because the at-fault employee was not licensed. When the injured patron
later filed suit, United Specialty initiated a declaratory judgment action
to determine whether its available coverage was $25,000 (under the
endorsement for unlicensed drivers) or $100,000. 53
In vacating the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for the injured
patron and applying the $100,000 limits of the policy, the Georgia Court
of Appeals specifically focused on the language of the reservation of rights
Helton, 354 Ga. App. at 210, 840 S.E.2d at 695.
Id. at 212, 840 S.E.2d at 695–96.
48 Id., 840 S.E.2d at 696.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 213–14, 840 S.E.2d at 697.
51 352 Ga. App. 299, 835 S.E.2d 1 (2019).
52 Id. at 305, 835 S.E.2d at 6.
53 Id. at 301, 835 S.E.2d at 3.
46
47
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letter sent by United Specialty. 54 Specifically, the court noted the letter
sent by United Specialty did not assert it was “uncertain” as to its rights
or the policy or unclear on how to proceed. 55 In fact, the letter mentioned
United Specialty had rejected the previous $100,000 demand and offered
$25,000. 56 The court held that “[h]ad United [Specialty] indicated in any
of its correspondence . . . that it was uncertain as to its obligation under
the policy,” the court’s decision would have been different, but United
Specialty “has asserted all along–with absolute certainty–that coverage
under the policy was limited to $25,000.” 57 The court concluded United
Specialty was “not in need of any direction from the court with respect to
future conduct on its part.” 58 Moreover, the court reiterated that an
insurer “may not refuse to pay (under its policy) and then use declaratory
judgment procedure as a means of avoiding bad faith penalties.” 59 The
Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court was without
jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment and that the petition was
invalid. 60
In Southern Trust Insurance Company v. Mountain Express Oil
Company, 61 the Georgia Court of Appeals held an insurer was obligated
to file a declaratory judgment action in order to protect itself from
liability for breach of contract and for bad faith when an insured objected
to the scope of the insurer’s defense. 62 After Mountain Express Oil
Company (MEX) was sued for breach of contract, injunctive relief, and
libel/slander by a rival company, Southern Trust Insurance Company
(Southern Trust) informed MEX that it was denying coverage on the nonlibel/slander claims and agreed to reimburse MEX’s legal fees for the
defense of the libel/slander claims. MEX sent Southern Trust a letter
disputing the decision on the non-libel/slander claims asserting its belief
that the policy provided coverage for all matters set forth in the lawsuit. 63
When the lawsuit against MEX settled, MEX demanded Southern
Trust pay for the entirety of its legal fees and subsequently filed suit
against Southern Trust for breach of contract and for bad faith,
contending Southern Trust had a duty to defend the entire suit. Southern
Trust moved for summary judgment, claiming that it fulfilled its duty

Id. at 303, 835 S.E.2d at 4.
Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 303–04, 835 S.E.2d at 4 (emphasis in original).
58 Id. at 304, 835 S.E.2d at 5.
59 Id. at 305, 835 S.E.2d at 6.
60 Id. at 306, 835 S.E.2d at 6.
61 351 Ga. App. 117, 828 S.E.2d 455 (2019).
62 Id. at 123, 828 S.E.2d at 459.
63 Id. at 118–19, 828 S.E.2d at 457.
54
55
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under the insurance contract. MEX responded that Southern Trust’s
failure to file a declaratory judgment to determine its duty to defend
precluded it from challenging its obligation to pay the full amount of fees.
The trial court concluded Southern Trust was under an obligation to
defend the entire suit and that its failure to file a declaratory judgment
action waived all of its defenses. 64
Following Southern Trust’s appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that Southern Trust was
obligated to defend the suit in its entirety and that its failure to do so
breached the Southern Trust policy. 65 Moreover, the court confirmed
there was no unequivocal acceptance by MEX of Southern Trust’s partial
defense since MEX notified the insurer “that it did not accept the refusal
to defend the entire suit.” 66 According to the court, Southern Trust “was
required to file a declaratory action to preserve its defenses and protect
itself from liability for breach of contract and bad faith.” 67
B. Insured’s Duty to Cooperate
Cooperation and the disclosure of information by an insured to its
insurer was the focus of Lloyd’s of London v. Navicent Health, Inc., 68
where the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
analyzed the insured’s obligation to disclose information requested by the
insurer. 69 After a former Navicent Health employee filed a qui tam action
alleging that, as an employee of Navicent, he was directed to “upcode”
Medicare billing to charge more for non-emergency ambulance
transportation, the government began investigating Navicent. Navicent,
in turn, forwarded a copy of the government’s demand to its insurer,
Lloyd’s of London (Lloyd’s), requesting that Lloyd’s indemnify Navicent
for expenses relating to the alleged “wrongful acts.” 70 Under the terms of
the Lloyd’s policy, Navicent was required to:
co-operate with [Lloyd’s of London] in all investigations, including
regarding the application and coverage under [the] Policy, . . . in all
aspects of the conduct of suits and in enforcing any right of
contribution or indemnity against any person or organization. 71

Id. at 119–20, 828 S.E.2d at 457–58.
Id. at 121, 828 S.E.2d at 459.
66 Id. at 123, 828 S.E.2d at 460.
67 Id.
68 No. 5:18-cv-00133, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172208, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 3, 2019).
69 Id. at *6.
70 Id.
71 Id. at *3.
64
65

140

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

Furthermore, Lloyd’s had the right to (i) “effectively associate with
[Navicent] in the investigation, defense and settlement of any Claim,”
and (ii) “conduct any investigation deemed necessary.” 72
During settlement negotiations, the government and Navicent each
presented to the other details concerning Navicent’s alleged violations
and Navicent’s own findings—information that Lloyd’s requested from
Navicent on multiple occasions but was refused. Lloyd’s also requested
memoranda, documents, and interview notes from Navicent which
Navicent either refused to provide on the grounds of privilege or provided
only after significant redacting. Once Navicent and the government
settled, Navicent demanded indemnification from Lloyd’s. Lloyd’s
responded by reiterating its previous demands only to be refused again. 73
Navicent asserted that the documents it provided “were ‘more than
sufficient to enable the Underwriters to conclude their investigation.’” 74
Lloyd’s initiated a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration
that Navicent breached by the policy by failing to cooperate with Lloyd’s
document demands. 75 Both parties moved for summary judgment but the
District Court denied the cross-motions, concluding that the sufficiency
of Navicent’s compliance and the explanation given by Navicent for its
refusals were jury issues. 76 The district court concluded that “Navicent
cooperated to some degree with Lloyd’s [of London’s] requests, and [that]
there [was] evidence that Navicent had some explanation for the
documents it did not produce, namely that the documents [were] either
privileged or do not exist.” 77 “Whether these explanations and Navicent’s
partial compliance were sufficient to satisfy,” the cooperation language
in the policy were “questions for [the] jury.” 78 The district court
specifically rejected Navicent’s claim that Lloyd’s had to prove prejudice
to its investigation due to Navicent’s alleged failure to cooperate. 79
According to the district court, if the information requested by Lloyd’s
was material, then “Navicent’s failure to produce it [was] prejudicial as
a matter of law.” 80 While the court agreed with Navicent that Lloyd’s
failure to subpoena the requested documents during litigation cast some
doubt on the materiality of the requests, the court concluded that
Id.
Id. at *3–7.
74 Id.
75 Id. at *8. Lloyd’s also sought a declaratory judgment that Navicent breached the
Policy’s “knowledge provision,” arguing Navicent had knowledge of the Wrongful Act prior
to the Continuity date.
76 Id. at *10.
77 Id. at *17–18.
78 Id. at *18.
79 Id.
80 Id. at *16–17.
72
73
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whether Lloyd’s was diligent in its own efforts to secure the documents
was also an issue to be decided by the jury. 81
C. Motor Vehicle Exclusion in Homeowner’s Policy
In Wilkinson v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 82 the
Georgia Court of Appeals rejected an insurer’s interpretation of the term
“use” as it related to a homeowner’s policy exclusion for loss arising out
of the “use” of a motor vehicle. 83 Mr. and Ms. Wilkinson visited a family
friend, Mr. Buchanan, to “look at” a pickup that Buchanan recently
purchased. Buchanan moved the truck on his inclined driveway so that
Mr. and Ms. Wilkinson could walk around it. The truck was in neutral,
was idling, and was facing down the drive toward the street with the
emergency brake engaged. When Buchanan and Mr. Wilkinson decided
to examine the engine, Buchanan asked Ms. Wilkinson to release the
truck’s hood latch, warning her not to release the parking brake. Ms.
Wilkinson reached under the dash for the hood latch but released the
brake instead. The truck lurched forward, knocking her down, rolling
over her, causing multiple injuries. Mr. and Ms. Wilkinson sued
Buchanan. Buchanan’s insurer, Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Company (GFB), filed a declaratory judgment action to determine
whether it was obligated to defend Buchanan. 84
The GFB policy excluded coverage for injuries arising out of the “use”
of a motor vehicle but did not define “use.” 85 The trial court granted
summary judgment for GFB, finding that Buchanan’s truck was in “use”
at the time of the accident because it was “being used . . . to demonstrate
its function and operability,” which resulted in Ms. Wilkinson’s
injuries. 86
In reversing the trial court, the Georgia Court of Appeals
acknowledged that the truck was at or near the location of the accident,
that the accident was caused by Ms. Wilkinson releasing the emergency
brake, and that the truck’s components were being examined at the time
of the accident. 87 Still, the court noted that, “while the term ‘use’ of a
motor vehicle does extend beyond actual physical contact, it does not
imply remoteness, and the term contemplates use of the motor vehicle as
a vehicle at the time of the injury.” 88 Ultimately, the court concluded that
Id. at *17.
351 Ga. App. 891, 833 S.E.2d 579 (2019).
83 Id. at 894, 833 S.E.2d at 582.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 892, 833 S.E.2d at 581.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 894, 833 S.E.2d at 582.
88 Id. (quoting Wingler v. White, 344 Ga. App. 94, 101, 808 S.E.2d 901, 907 (2017)).
81
82
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because Buchanan’s truck was “parked in [the] driveway,” and “was [not]
in use as a vehicle at the time of the accident,” the trial court erred in
determining that GFB was not obligated to Buchanan in the suit against
him. 89
IV. PROPERTY INSURANCE CASES
A. Waiver of Rescission
In Grange Mutual Casualty Company v. Bennett, 90 the issue before the
Georgia Court of Appeals was whether Grange Mutual Casualty
Company (Grange Mutual) properly rescinded a policy of workers’
compensation
insurance
issued
to
McCormick
Enterprises
(McCormick). 91 McCormick was a greenhouse repair and maintenance
company that previously had coverage with Liberty Mutual but switched
coverage to Grange Mutual. The dispute arose concerning the accuracy
of information in the application for the Grange Mutual policy. The
application indicated that McCormick provided janitorial services,
worked only in Georgia, and did not work at elevations above fifteen
feet. 92
After the policy was issued, McCormick submitted a claim for an
incident that occurred in Louisiana. The incident prompted further
investigation. 93 Following the investigation, an underwriter with Grange
Mutual concluded that Grange Mutual would not have issued the policy
if it had known that McCormick operated in thirty states and that
McCormick’s employees were cleaning windows at heights above fifteen
feet. Grange Mutual conferred with counsel about rescinding the policy
but ultimately decided to cancel the policy. 94 Grange Mutual issued “a
cancellation notice on December 18, 2014, with [a cancellation] date of
March 8, 2015.” 95 On March 7, 2015, another employee of McCormick
filed a workers’ compensation claim for an incident in New York. 96
Following an ALJ hearing on the New York incident, Grange Mutual
submitted a brief arguing against coverage on several grounds. The ALJ
found in favor of McCormick. On appeal to the Board, Grange Mutual
argued for rescission under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7, among other grounds.
The Board upheld the ALJ’s findings, concluding that it was unnecessary
Id. at 895, 833 S.E.2d at 583.
350 Ga. App. 608, 829 S.E.2d 834 (2019).
91 Id. at 611, 829 S.E.2d at 836; see O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7 (2020).
92 Id. at 610–11, 829 S.E.2d at 835–36.
93 Id. at 610, 829 S.E.2d at 835.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id., 829 S.E.2d at 836.
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to address rescission under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7; thus prompting an appeal
and a remand back to the Board. Ultimately, the Board held that Grange
Mutual waived the rescission under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7, which was
affirmed by the Superior Court. Grange Mutual appealed the waiver
issue. 97
Before the Georgia Court of Appeals, Grange Mutual argued the
merits of a rescission under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7. 98 However, the court
concluded that it did not have to reach the merits of the rescission defense
because Grange Mutual waived the defense. 99 Reaffirming its holdings
in previous cases, the court reiterated that “an insurer seeking to rescind
a policy must” announce its intent in a “timely fashion, as soon as the
facts supporting the claim for rescission are discovered.” 100 If, instead of
rescission, an insurer issues a denial of coverage or cancels the policy, the
right of rescission is waived. 101 Citing Loeb v. Nationwide Mutual Fire
Insurance Co., 102 the court held that “because the insurer canceled the
policy and retained the premium, the policy was not void from its
inception.” 103
B. Duty to Read and Examine the Policy
In Martin v. Chasteen, 104 Mark Martin (Martin) procured insurance
coverage in December 2011 through his agent, Thomas Chasteen
(Chasteen), for various structures located on Martin’s farm. The policy
was renewed each December and Martin received declarations pages
outlining the structures that were covered. 105 “In 2013 and 2014, Martin
built a new horse barn on [his] property.” 106 Martin and Chasteen
discussed coverage for the horse barn but it was never added to the policy.
107 “In February [of] 2016, the [horse] barn was struck by lightning and
destroyed.” 108 Martin sued Chasteen for failing to add the horse barn to

Id.
Id.
99 Id. at 612, 829 S.E.2d at 837.
100 Id. at 611–12, 829 S.E.2d at 837 (quoting American Safety Indem. Co. v. Sto Corp.,
342 Ga. App. 263, 271, 802 S.E.2d 448, 455 (2017)).
101 Id. at 612, 829 S.E.2d at 837.
102 162 Ga. App. 561, 562, 292 S.E.2d 409, (1982).
103 Grange Mutual, 350 Ga. App. at 612, 829 S.E.2d at 837.
104 354 Ga. App. 518, 841 S.E.2d 157 (2020).
105 Id. at 518–19, 841 S.E.2d at 159.
106 Id. at 519, 841 S.E.2d at 159.
107 Id. at 519–20, 841 S.E.2d at 160.
108 Id. at 519, 841 S.E.2d at 159.
97
98
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the policy. Chasteen obtained summary judgment from the trial court.
Martin appealed. 109
On appeal, Martin argued that his duty to read the policy did not
authorize summary judgment because there was a question of fact
whether he possessed a copy of the entire policy rather than just the
policy declarations. 110 The Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed. 111
Relying upon a previous decision, the court reiterated its general rule
that
[I]nsureds are charged with knowledge of the insurance policy’s
contents, and are bound by those contents even if they do not have
physical possession of the policy. Martin alleged the existence of a
policy, [he was charged] with knowledge of its contents. Insured
persons under an insurance policy are presumed to know its conditions
if they intend to rely upon its benefits, or else they must find out those
conditions. That is particularly true when, as in this case, the policy in
issue is a renewal policy. 112

Having resolved the delivery issue in favor of the agent, the Georgia
Court of Appeals went on to rule in the agent’s favor under the duty to
read and its exceptions. 113 The court acknowledged and discussed
exceptions to the duty to read but noted that the exceptions do not apply
where “an examination of the policy would have made it readily apparent
that the [requested] coverage was not issued.” 114 Further, the court found
that Martin failed to present evidence of the existence of a confidential
or unusual relationship between he and Chasteen that would have
prevented or excused him from exercising ordinary diligence for his own
protection. 115 The fact that Martin and Chasteen had worked together for
years on insurance matters and had “come to repose trust and confidence
in each other as the result of such dealings” was not sufficient, in and of
itself, to conclude that a confidential relationship existed between

Id.
Id. at 520, 841 S.E.2d at 160.
111 Id. at 519, 841 S.E.2d at 159.
112 Id. at 520, 841 S.E.2d at 160 (quoting Burkett v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 278 Ga.
App. 681, 682–83, 629 S.E.2d 558, 560 (2006)); See, e.g., Southeastern Security Ins. Co. v.
Empire Banking Co., 230 Ga. App. 755, 757, 498 S.E.2d 282 (1998); Wells Fargo Home Mtg.
v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-12380, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 26065, at *915 (11th Cir. 2006)
(Under Georgia law, “an insured without a copy of the policy must make an effort to
ascertain the policy’s terms.”).
113 Id. at 520–21, 841 S.E.2d at 160–61.
114 Id. at 521, 841 S.E.2d at 161 (quoting MacIntyre & Edwards Inc. v. Rich, 267 Ga.
App. 78, 81, 599 S.E.2d 15, 18 (2004)).
115 Id. at 521, 841 S.E.2d at 161.
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them. 116 Accordingly, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed summary
judgment in favor of Chasteen. 117
C. “Seepage or Leakage” Exclusion in Homeowner’s Policy
In an unpublished decision from the Eleventh Circuit, insurers
received some guidance on an issue that frequently comes up but often
does not result in written opinions. In Landrum v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
118 the Eleventh Circuit interpreted a “seepage or leakage” exclusion. 119
The policyholder, Landrum, had a water leak in a supply line to her
refrigerator ice maker, which resulted in mold. Landrum submitted a
claim with Allstate. 120 Allstate denied Landrum’s claim based upon a
“continuous or repeated seepage or leakage” exclusion in the Allstate
policy that defined “seepage” as meaning a “continuous or repeated
seepage or leakage over a period of weeks, months, or years of water.” 121
In the district court, Landrum argued that incident was a sudden loss,
rather than a seepage; that the exclusion was ambiguous; and that, even
if not ambiguous, Allstate should cover the damages that occurred during
the first thirteen days of the leak since the exclusion only applied to leaks
that occurred over a period of “weeks.” The district court rejected the
arguments and granted summary judgment to Allstate. 122
On appeal, Landrum argued that the exclusion applied only to slowmoving releases of water, but the Eleventh Circuit disagreed. 123 Because
Landrum’s policy excluded seepage or leakage, the use of the disjunctive
“or” indicated that the terms seepage and leakage should be treated
separately. 124 Since the policy did not define those terms, the court used
an ordinary dictionary meaning to conclude that “leakage” did not have
a speed component. 125 Therefore, Landrum’s policy excluded slow
seepage or sudden or slow leakage and, “the district court did not err by
interpreting the exclusion to include ‘any escape of water, including that
which is slow-moving and that which is not.’” 126

116 Id. at 521–22, 841 S.E.2d at 161 (quoting Canales v. Wilson Southland Ins. Agency,
261 Ga. App. 529, 531, 583 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2003)).
117 Id. at 522, 841 S.E.2d at 162.
118 No. 19-14539, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 14908, at *606 (11th Cir. 2020).
119 Id. at *607.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at *609.
124 Id.
125 Id. at *610 (citing Seepage and Leakage, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Online
ed. 2020)).
126 Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Landrum’s argument in the district
court that, because the exclusion applied only for losses that occurred
“over a period of weeks,” the exclusion would not apply to leaks occurring
before the second week, between days one and thirteen. 127 Likewise, the
court rejected Landrum’s contention that she had “a covered water loss,”
during the first thirteen days of the leak and thus was entitled to mold
remediation. 128 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the record of water usage
for Landrum’s home and the adjuster’s testimony was unrefuted by
Landrum. 129 For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary
judgement in Allstate’s favor. 130
D. Implied Waiver of Lapsed Policy
In another unpublished opinion, Brannen v. Jackson National Life
Insurance Co., the Eleventh Circuit also rejected an effort to reinstate a
lapsed life insurance policy on the grounds of waiver. 131 Bishop
Brannen’s heirs sought to recover $2.3 million from a life insurance policy
that lapsed before Brannen’s death. The heirs’ attorney sent a demand
letter and check for the past-due premiums to Jackson National Life
Insurance Company (Jackson) which were received on March 15, 2017.
Jackson deposited the premium check on March 22, 2017. A Jackson
employee later determined that the policy lapsed. Jackson refunded the
premium to the heirs on March 27, 2017. The heirs sued in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The district court
granted summary judgment to Jackson. 132
The heirs made two arguments on appeal. First, the heirs argued that
Jackson waived the policy lapse by accepting the premium payment. 133
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument stating that Jackson did not
improperly “retain” the premium so as to waive the lapsed coverage
defense. 134 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that Georgia courts
recognize that retaining premium payments after a lapse in coverage
could imply a waiver of a lapsed policy. 135 However, the Eleventh Circuit
referred back to its holding in Rutland v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Co., 136 where it held that retaining a premium payment for six
Id. at *608.
Id.
129 Id. at *609.
130 Id. at *610.
131 No. 19-14025, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 13038, at *702 (11th Cir. 2020).
132 Id. at *703.
133 Id. at *704.
134 Id. at *704–05.
135 Id. (citing Georgia Masonic Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 52 Ga. 640, 642–43 (1874)).
136 No. 10-10734, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9859, at *771 (11th Cir. 2011).
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weeks “was not unreasonably long.” 137 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit
distinguished another case, Horace Mann Life Insurance Co. v.
Lunsford, 138 where a waiver was found when the insurer retained the
belated payment for almost two months. 139
The court also rejected the heirs’ argument that, by endorsing and
depositing the premium check, Jackson entered into a new contract for
the policy. 140 The court noted, “[T]he Georgia Court of Appeals has held
that ‘[t]the acceptance of premiums after default does not create a new
contract, but merely continues the binding effect of the original
policy.’” 141 The Eleventh Circuit warned that acquiescing to the heirs’
reasoning “would mean that any insured could send a letter and check to
their insurer and then bind the insurer to whatever ‘offer’ the letter
purportedly described when the check is deposited.” 142 For these reasons,
the court concluded that the District Court did not err in granting
summary judgment in Jackson’s favor. 143
V. CONCLUSION
Few of the insurance decisions during this survey period were groundbreaking or reflect significant changes in Georgia law. While the Georgia
Court of Appeals continued to refine the intricacies of UM law in Georgia,
many of the other court decisions reiterated long-standing principles in
the property, liability, and automobile insurance arenas. While this
survey included a few unpublished Eleventh Circuit or federal district
court decisions, they were included because they reflected trends,
arguments, or issues that practitioners may consider unique or
important to an insurance practice.

Brannen, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 13038, at *704.
Ga. App. 866, 324 S.E.2d 808 (1984).
139 Id.
140 Brannen, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 13038, at*702.
141 Id. at *705 (quoting Union Cent. Life Insurance Co. v. Merrell, 52 Ga. App. 831, 184
S.E. 655, 657 (1936)).
142 Id.
143 Id.
137

138172

